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A DISCOVERY RULE IN

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
MASSACHUSETTS JOINS THE FOLD
DAVID

I.

A.

SONENSHEIN*

INTRODUCTION

By 1980, forty-one jurisdictions, either by court decision or
legislation, had adopted some kind of "discovery" rule regarding
statutes of limitations in medical malpractice cases.! Generally, dis
* B.A., Cornell University, 1969; J.D., New York University, 1972; Associate Pro
fessor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
1. See Jones v. Rogers Memorial Hosp., 442 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Shillady
v. Elliot Community Hosp., 114 N.H. 321, 320 A.2d 637 (1974); Melnyk v. Cleveland
Clinic, 32 Ohio St. 2d 198,290 N.E.2d 916 (1972); Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla.
1962); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Morgan v. Grace Hosp.
Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965); Alabama (ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1975));
Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-564 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980)); Arkansas
(ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2616 (1979)); California (CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE § 340.5
(Deering Supp. 1980)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-105 (1977)); Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West 1969)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 6856 (Cum. Supp. 1980)); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 12-301(8)
(West 1966)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(b) (West Supp. 1980)); Georgia
(GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3.1102-1103 (Cum. Supp. 1980)); Hawaii (HAWAII REV. STAT. §
657-7.3 (1977)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 5-219(4) (1979)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
83, §, 22.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1(9) (West Cum.
Supp. 1980)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-513(a)(7), (b)(c) (1976)); Kentucky (Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1980)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 9, § 5628 (West Supp. 1980)); Maryland (MD. Cn. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 5-109 (1980)); Michigan (MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5838 (Cum. Supp.
1980-1981)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1980-1981)); Missouri
(Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (Vernon Supp. 1981)); Montana (MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 27-2-205 (1979)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2828 (1978)); Nevada (NEV.
REV. STAT. § 41A.097 (1979)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:4
(Supp. 1979)); New Jersey (N.]. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952)); New York (N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. LAW § 214-a (McKinney 1980-1981)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §
1-15(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp.
1979)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(B) (Page Supp. 1980)); Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 18 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981)); Oregon (OR. REV.
STAT. § 12.1104(4) (1979)); Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524(2) (Purdon
1980)); Rhode Island (R.!. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.1 (Supp. 1980)); South Carolina (S.C.
CODE § 15-3-545 (Cum. Supp. 1980)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3415,
28-304 (Cum. Supp. 1979)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (Supp. 1979)); Ver
mont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 521 (Supp. 1980)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE
433
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covery rules provide that the statute of limitations does not begin
to run when a negligent act occurs: rather, the statute begins to
run when the injured party discovers, or reasonably should have
discovered, that a claim exists, whichever occurs first. 2 Until 1980,
Massachusetts was aligned with the small minority of jurisdictions
that still did not recognize discovery as the event to trigger the
statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations for medical malpractice, enacted in
Massachusetts in 1921, provided that "[a]ctions of contract or tort
for malpractice ... against physicians [and] ... hospitals ... shall
be commenced only within two years next after the cause of action
accrues."3 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court first rejected
a "discovery" interpretation of "accrual" in 1929 in Capucci v.
Barone. 4 The justices, believing that they were constrained by the
legislature's failure to adopt a discovery rule in the wake of
Capucci, reluctantly resisted a growing national trend. 5 In 1966, in
Pasquale v. Chandler, 6 the court again refused to adopt a discovery
rule for medical malpractice actions. Between 1966 and 1980, how
ever, a discovery rule for medical malpractice had been adopted in
the vast majority of jurisdictions. 7 During that time, the Massa
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted "accrual" of claims to
mean "discovery" in two kinds of cases: Legal malpractice actions8
and actions against real estate agents for misrepresentation. 9
With this background, the supreme judicial court, in the
spring of 1980, was faced once again with the issue of whether to
adopt a medical malpractice discovery rule in the cases of Teller v.
Schepens 10 and Franklin v. Albert.! 1 Interest in the issue was
strong: amicus curiae briefs were filed by the Massachusetts Bar
ANN. § 416.350 (Cum. Supp. 1981)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12(b)
(1981)); Wyoming (WYo. STAT. § 1-3-107 (1977)).
2. See Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 305,402 N.E. 2d 560, 564 (1979).
3. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 4 (West Cum. Supp. 1981) (emphasis
added). Section 4 was amended in 1965 to provide a three-year rather than two-year
statutory period.
4. 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1929).
5. In 1965, the Massachusetts House of Representatives rejected a bill which
would have established a discovery rule. Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450,
456-57,215 N.E.2d 319, 322-23 (1966).
6. 350 Mass. 450, 450, 215 N.E.2d 319, 319 (1966).
7. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
8. Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974).
9. Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. 482, 358 N.E.2d 994 (1976).
10. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2199, 411 N.E.2d 464.
11. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2187, 411 N.E.2d 458.
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Association, supporting the adoption of the discovery rule, and by
the Massachusetts Medical Society, opposing the adoption of the
rule.
Plaintiff in Teller suffered the total loss of sight in his right eye
and substantial impainnent of vision in his left eye as a result of a
gunshot wound. 12 On April 2, 1976, defendant physician examined
plaintiff and recommended surgery on the left eye. 13 Defendant
operated on plaintiff on three occasions between April 15 and May
10, 1976 and discharged plaintiff from his care on June 29, 1976. 14
On that date, defendant, for the first time, infonned plaintiff that
nothing could be done to restore vision in his right eye and that
the substantial loss of vision in his left eye would be pennanent. 15
Plaintiff commenced a malpractice action against defendant on June
27, 1979, just two days short of three years from the date he first
learned of the possible malpractice; more than three years, how~
ever, had passed since defendant's last operation on plaintiff. 1s
In Franklin, plaintiffs, husband and wife, based their malprac~
tice action on the following allegations. Plaintiff husband was ad~
mitted to defendant hospital for oral surgery in January 1974.17
Upon admission he complained of chest pains. A chest x~ray was
taken and plaintiff husband was discharged two days later with an
erroneous notation on his discharge summary stating that the x~ray
was nonnal,18 In fact, the radiology department's report mentioned
an "apparent left superior mediastinal widening" and noted "[fJur~
ther evaluation of this is recommended. "19 Plaintiff husband never~
theless was discharged without being informed of the radiological
findings. 2o In January 1978, plaintiff husband returned to defend~
ant hospital complaining of chest discomfort. 21 An x~ray revealed
Hodgkins disease. 22 Plaintiff filed suit in July 1978 claiming that
the "widening" noted in the 1974 x~ray was the early stage of
Hodgkins disease and that defendant's failure to report and evalu~

12, 1980 Mass, Adv, Sh, at 2199, 411 N.K2d at 465.
13. Id. at 2200, 411 N.E.2d at 465.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. [d.
17. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2188,411 N.E.2d at 460.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 2188-89, 411 N .E.2d at 460.
[d. at 2189,411 N.E.2d at 460.
[d.
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ate such finding constituted malpractice. 23 Suit was filed approxi
mately six months after plaintiff's discovery of the alleged malprac
tice but four and one-half years after the allegedly negligent act. 24
The trial judges in both Teller and Franklin granted defend
ants' motions for summary judgment, ruling that the claims were
barred by the statute of limitations because both actions were com
menced more than three years after the occurrence of the last al
legedly negligent act.2S In both cases, the courts relied on Capucci
and Pasquale. 26 Plaintiffs appealed, and the supreme judicial court
took the appeals on direct review.

II.

EVOLUTION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE IN MASSACHUSETTS

Defendants in Teller and Franklin opposed judicial adoption of
a discovery rule. Defendants in Franklin argued that the medical
malpractice statute of limitations was set by the legislature and that
the courts therefore were barred from altering or amending it.27
By definition a statute of limitations is a creature of the legislature,
and it is beyond question that when the legislature clearly articu
lates the terms of the statute the courts have no role to play, save
in enforcing the statute. When the legislature has failed to deline
ate whether the term "accrues" refers to the happening of the neg
ligent act or to its discovery, however, it is clearly within the
courts' traditional province to interpret the statute's meaning. In
deed, in the recent opinion of Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 28
the supreme judicial court, in interpreting the statute of limitations
for products liability actions, ruled that "[w ]hile the Legislature
had established a time limit within which tort actions must be
brought, it has left for judicial determination the time when 'the
cause of action accrues.' "29
In so ruling, the Cannon court echoed a 1974 decision,
Hendrickson v. Sears, 30 which announced a discovery rule for legal
malpractice. The court stated: "in general the definition of accrual

23.

[d.

24.

[d.

25.

[d. at 2189, 411 N.E.2d at 460.1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2200, 411 N.E.2d at

465.
26. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2187-88, 411 N.E.2d at 459; 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at
2200 n.2, 411 N.E.2d at 465 n.2.
27. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2190-91,411 N.E.2d at 461.
28. 374 Mass. 739, 374 N .E.2d 582 (1978).
29. [d. at 740, 374 N.E.2d at 583.
30. 365 Mass. 83.310 N.E.2d 131 (1974).
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has been left to judicial rationalization and interpretation. "31 In
deed, as the court pointed out in Franklin, the "date of the act"
rule, relied on by defendants, was itself the product of judicial in
terpretation of chapter 260, section 4 of the Massachusetts General
Laws. 32 More particularly, defendants in Franklin argued that the
court's 1966 Pasquale decision "forecloses further judicial consider
ation of the proper time of accrual of a medical malpractice
claim. "33 In so arguing, defendants invited reappraisal of the
Pasquale decision and the Capucci doctrine on which Pasquale
rested.
A.

Capucci: Discovery Rule Rejected

In 1929, the supreme judicial court first interpreted chapter
260, section 4 of the Massachusetts General Laws in Capucci v.
Barone. 34 Citing no authority, the Capucci court ruled that "ac
crual" refers to the time when the negligent act occurS. 35 In so
doing, the court expressly refused to adopt a "discovery" interpre
tation of "accrual," asserting that the date when the actual damage
results or is ascertained has no bearing on accrual of the cause of
action. 3s
The last is a curious statement since damage is an element of a
cause of action in tort or contract and a plaintiff who cannot allege
or prove damage cannot maintain an action under either theory.
Indeed, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged
this both before<l7 and after3 8 the Capucci decision. If Capucci
were correct in holding that the occurrence of damage is irrelevant
to "accrual" of a claim, the decision would mandate the ludicrous
result that a claim which had not yet matured could be barred be
cause injury did not become manifest within the statutorily man
dated time peliod.
After Capucci, the court did not have the opportunity to inter
pret section 4 again until 1966 when the court reaffirmed the
Capucci rule in Pasquale v. Chandler. 39
31. Id. at 88,310 N.E.2d at 134.
32. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2193,411 N.E.2d at 462.
33. Id. at 2190, 411 N.E.2d at 461. Franklin overruled Pasquale. Id. at 2191,
411 N.E.2d at 461.
34. 266 Mass. 578, 580, 165 N.E. 653, 654 (1929).
35. Id. at 581, 165 N.E. at 654-55.
36. Id., 165 N.E. at 655.
37. Sullivan v. Old Colony St. Ry., 200 Mass. 303, 303, 86 N.E. 511, 511 (1908).
38. Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 Mass. at 742, 341 N.E.2d at 584.
39. Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 456,215 N.E.2d 319, 319. Franklin over
ruled Pasquale. See note 33 supra.
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Pasquale: Capucci Reluctantly Affinned

In Pasquale the supreme judicial court recognized that in the
period between Capucci and Pasquale the trend toward "discov
ery" had begun in earnest throughout the United States. 40 The
court, reluctantly following Capucci, stated that "were it not for re
cent legislation, we would be disposed to reconsider the question
[of a discovery rule]. "41
The recent legislation alluded to was a bill considered in 1965
by the Massachusetts House of Representatives. 42 This bill would
have amended section 4 to explicitly provide a modified discovery
rule with a five-year "outer limit. "43 In other words, the two-year
statute of limitations would have begun to run upon discovery, but
in no event could the action have been maintained after five years
from the date of the negligent act. The bill was passed by the
house 44 and sent to the Massachusetts Senate with a single modifi
cation, elimination of the outer limit. In deleting the outer limit,
the house apparently endorsed an .unrestricted discovery rule. The
senate, however, failed to pass the house bill, instead adopting a
version of section 4 which was identical to the old one except for
an extension of the statute of limitations from two years to three
years. 45 According to the supreme judicial court in Pasquale, this
legislative history made it apparent that the legislature chose to re
ject a discovery rule. 46
Because of this legislative action, or inaction, the Pasquale
court held that it was barred from interpreting "accrues" to mean
"discovery. "47 This reasoning has superficial appeal. After all, if the
statute is a creature of the legislature, any change in the statute
should come from the legislature. If the legislature rejects a bill
that would have overturned an earlier judicial interpretation of the
statute regarding the term "accrual," then the legislature appar
ently seeks no change in meaning. All this is unexceptionable but
is beside the point. The Pasquale court was not called upon to
change a statute but to interpret it, clearly a role historically within
40.
41.
42.

350 Mass. at 456,215 N.E.2d at 322.
Id.
See legislative history of House Bill No. 530, cited in Pasquale v. Chandler,

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 455-58,215 N.E.2d at 322-23.
Id. at 457-58,215 N.E.2d at 323.
1965 Mass. Acts, ch. 302.
350 Mass. at 458, 215 N .E.2d at 323.
Id.

id.

1981]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DISCOVERY RULE

439

the court's province. 48 Indeed, since Pasquale, the court has made
it abundantly clear that it is empowered to interpret statutes in
general and the term "accrual" in particular. 49
In addition, the Pasquale court emphasized that the drafters of
the rejected discovery rule bill referred to "accrual" as "time of oc
currence" rather than "time of discovery. "50 The house bill pro
vided that "actions of contract or tort for malpractice . . . shall be
commenced only within two years next after the injured party has
knowledge of the facts which give rise to a cause of action but only
within five years after the cause of action accrues. "51 The Pasquale
court reasoned that the drafters of the house bill recognized that
section 4 incorporated the Capucci "time of occurrence" interpreta
tion of accrual or else the drafters would not have sought to amend
it. According to the court, therefore, rejection of the bill meant
that the legislature intended Capucci to continue in effect. 52 The
legislative drafters' recognition that "accrual" means "time of occur
rence," however, was merely the recognition that Capucci was the
law. This is not legislative intent; it shows only that members of
the legislature can read a controlling court decision. To admit that
Capucci exists does not verifY its correctness.
C.

Franklin: Discovery Rule Prevails

More fundamentally, however, as the Franklin court recently
pointed out, it is impossible for the court to find legislative intent
in the legislature's failure to' pass a particular bill.5 3 Rather, de
bates and other legislative history concerning a bill which was en
acted into law reveal the intent of the majority of those who voted
for it. Knowing the legislature's intent aids in the interpretation of
an enacted statute. In Pasquale, however, the court did not look to
legislative history but merely to postenactment occurrences to see
if the legislature chose to amend the existing law. This is not legis
lative history and cannot indicate the intent of the legislature
which passed section 4. The history of the house bill shows that
the legislature chose not to enact a two-year discovery rule with a
48. Id. at 455-56,215 N.E.2d at 321-22.
49. See Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 Mass. at 740, 374 N.E.2d at 583;
Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. at 88, 310 N.E.2d at 134; notes 29-32 supra and ac
companying text.
50. 350 Mass. at 457,215 N.E.2d at 322-23.
51. Id. at 456-57,215 N.E.2d at 323.
52. Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. at 458,215 N.E.2d at 323.
53. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2191-93; 411 N.E.2d at 461-62.
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five-year outer limit, but it fails to indicate how another discovery
rule would have fared.
Mistaken reliance on the legislature's decision not to enact a
discovery rule was discussed by the Oregon Supreme Court in
1966 in Berry v. Branner. 54 Prior to Berry, the Oregon legislature
twice had rejected bills which would have adopted a discovery rule
in medical malpractice cases. This rejection occurred while the
prevailing judicial interpretation of "accrual" in Oregon was the
"time of the negligent act."55 Faced with the argument that such
legislative rejection of "discovery" made further judicial interpreta
tion of "accrual" inappropriate, the Oregon Supreme Court said:
The fallacy in this argument is that no one knows why the legis
lature did not pass the proposed measures. . . . Did the legisla
ture fail to p~s the measures because it was satisfied with the
[prior case law's] interpretations of the statute or because It was
not in favor of an overall limitation, or because it disliked the
length of the overall limitation? The practicalities of the legisla
tive process furnish many reasons for the lack of success of a
measure other than legislative dislike for the principle involved
in the legislation. Legislative inaction is a weak reed upon which
to lean in determining legisl;ttive intent. 56

Having demonstrated the weakness of the Pasquale court's
reasoning, the Franklin court liberated itself from Pasquale's re
straints:
[W]e do not read the failure to enact these bills as necessarily
disapproving, in principle, a discovery rule. Further, we reject
the suggestion that defeated legislative proposals have the power
to disable us, in a proper case, from considering the questions
presented by such proposals and from abandoning prior con~lu
sions that now seem inappropriate. 57

The court further declared that Massachusetts courts have long ex
ercised the power to interpret statutes of limitations when explicit
legislative direction is absent. 58 The court explained that its 1929

54.

245 Or. 307, 311-12, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966), cited ill Franklin v. Albert,

id. at 2192, 411 N.E.2d at 461.
55. As in Massachusetts, the Oregon House passed discovery rule statutes only
to have them rejected in the state senate. See Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 311, 421
P.2d 996, 998 (1966).
56. 245 Or. at 311, 421 P.2d at 998.
57. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2193, 411 N.E.2d at 462.
58. [d., 411 N.E.2d at 462.
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decision in Capucci, and not a statute, first established that a med
ical malpractice claim accrues at the time of the negligent act. 59
Having decided that the court had the power to interpret sec
tion 4, the justices then turned to the task of interpretation. In
construing the meaning of the term "accrues," the court looked to
three commonly employed sources. First, the court referred to its
own prior interpretations of the term "accrues." As the court
noted, the term "accrues" had been before it three times in recent
years in the context of contract, deceit, and products liability
causes of action. 6o In the 1974 case of Hendrickson v. Sears,6! the
court ruled that the term "accrues" refers to the time when an act
of legal malpractice is discovered rather than the time when the act
occurS. 62 The court ruled that this definition of "accrual" was re
quired whether the action was brought under Massachusetts' con
tract statute of limitations63 or under the general tort statute of
limitations. 64 Similarly, in the 1976 case of Friedman v.
Jablonski,65 the supreme judicial court held that a cause of action
for a broker's deceit in the sale of real estate "accrues" on
plaintiffs discovery of such deceit. 66 Finally, in Cannon v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 67 the court said, without reaching the question of
a discovery rule, that a cause of action in products liability "ac
crues," at least, at the time of injury rather than on the earlier date
of manufacture or sale. 68 The Franklin court commented that all
three cases, including Cannon, "recognize the principle that a
plaintiff should be put on notice before his claim is barred."69
The court's inquiry next turned to the law of sister jurisdic
tions. The vast majority of jurisdictions were found to have adopted
some form of a discovery rule. 70 Moreover, the court could have
argued that not only have forty-one other jurisdictions adopted a
discovery rule in medical malpractice cases but, more to the point,
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
ery ntle.

[d.
[d. at 2194-95, 411 N.E.2d at 463.
365 Mass. 83, 83, 310 N.E.2d 131, 131 (1974).
[d. at 91, 310 N.E.2d at 136.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
[d. § 2A.
371 Mass. 482, 358 N.E.2d 994 (1976).
[d. at 485-86,358 N.E.gd at 997.
374 Mass. 739,739,374 N.E.2d 582, 582 (1978).
[d. at 742-43, 374 N.E.2d at 584.
1980 Mass, Adv. Sh. at 2195,411 N .E.2d at 463.
[d. See note 1 supra fur a list of jurisdictions which have adopted a discov
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the vast majority of courts that have faced the issue have construed
"accrual" of a malpractice claim to mean "discovery."71
Finally, the court addressed the policy arguments advanced
both in favor of and in opposition to a discovery rule. Though
recognizing that the "policy of affording repose"72 and the policy of
encouraging plaintiffs "to bring actions within prescribed deadlines
when evidence is fresh and available"73 are important goals of stat
utes of limitations, the court noted that Capucci and Pasquale had
failed to balance these goals against "the harm of being deprived of
a remedy. "74 Though declining, by ignoring, plaintiffs' invitation to
declare the Capucci doctrine unconstitutional as a deprivation of
due process, the Franklin court determined: "the manifest injustice
of the Capucci doctrine is that, rather than punishing negligent de
lay by the plaintiff, it punishes blameless ignorance by holding a
medical malpractice action time-barred before the plaintiff reason
ably could know the harm he has suffered. "75 In short, the court
reasoned that statutes of limitations, though designed to protect a
defendant from a stale claim, should not concomitantly deny a

71. Jones v. Rogers Memorial Hosp., 442 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Mayer v.
Good Samaritan Hosp., 14 Ariz. App. 248, 482 P.2d 497 (1971); Stafford v. Schultz, 42
Cal. 2d 767, 270 P.2d 1 (1954); Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603
(1970); Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968); City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d
306 (Fla. 1954); Parker v. Vaughan, 124 Ga. App. 300, 183 S.E.2d 605 (1971);
Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Hawaii 150,433 P.2d 220 (1967); Renner v. Edwards, 93
Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1969); Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262
N.E.2d 450 (1970); Chris chilIes v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94 (1967);
Hackworth v. Hart, 474 SW.2d 377 (Ky. 1971); Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459 SW.2d 166
(Ky. 1970); Springer v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 169 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 1964);
Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966); Dyke v. Richard, 390
Mich. 739,213 N.W.2d 185 (1973); Johnson v. St. Patrick Hosp., 148 Mont. 125,417
P.2d 469 (1966); Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962); Shillady v.
Elliot Community Hosp., 114 N.H. 321, 320,A.2d 637 (1974); Fox v. Passaic Gen.
Hosp., 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976); Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563
(1973); Fernandi v. StrulIy, 35 N.]. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Flanagan v. Mount
Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); Iverson v. Lancaster, 158
NW.2d 507 (N.D. 1968); Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St. 2d 198, 290
N.E.2d 916 (1972); Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1962); Frohs v. Greene, 253
Or. 1, 452 P.2d 564 (1969); Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996 (1966); Ayers
v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224,
243 A.2d 745 (1968); Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974); Hays v. Hall,
488 SW.2d 412 (Tex. 1972); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967);
Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968); Janisch v. Mullins, 1
Wash. App. 393, 461 P.2d 895 (1969).

72. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2194, 411 N.E.2d at 463.
73. [d.
74. [d. at 2193, 411 N.E.2d at 462.
75. [d. at 2194, 411 N.E.2d at 463.
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plaintiff the right to assert a claim before such claim has matured,
particularly when a plaintiff is utterly blameless for the delay in
commencing suit.
Defendants asserted that recognition of a discovery rule in the
medical malpractice context could be contrary to public policy: de
fendants argued that a discovery rule would somehow exacerbate
the "malpractice crisis. "76 The burgeoning number of malpractice
actions and the increasing size of awards together have caused mal
practice insurance rates to increase dramatically, even compelling
some insurance companies to refuse to insure doctors in
Massachusetts. 77 According to defendants, if a discovery rule were ,
adopted, higher rates and the refusal of some insurers to under
write at least some kinds of medical specialties would affect the de
livery of health and medical services in the Commonwealth. 78
Though a medical malpractice insurance crisis might exist, de
fendants failed to make any fair and reasonable connection between
alleviation of that crisis and a rejection of the discovery rule. If the
cause of the crisis is an increase in the number of fraudulent mal
practice claims, then the medical malpractice screening proce
dure,79 followed since 1975, is the much more efficient vehicle for
separating false claims from legitimate actions. The frequency of
fraudulent claims will not increase significantly by extending the
commencement of the statute of limitations period to the time
when individuals reasonably might discover the injury and thus as
sert the claim. Indeed, one suspects that the real argument in the
minds of defendants goes as follows: the malpractice crisis is caused
essentially by the dramatic increase in the volume of claims and
the amount of awards; any measures which serve to reduce the
volume of litigation are salutary; and rejection of a discovery rule
will reduce the number of claims because potential claims will be
time-barred. Such a policy argument, however, in no way relates
to the purpose of statutes of limitations and fails to discriminate be
tween valid and frivolous claims. The argument's most serious defi
ciency is its failure to account for the elimination of valid claims
prior to their discovery and maturity, the basic unfairness which
led the supreme judicial court to abandon the Capucci doctrine.
Finally, defendants, on behalf of medical practitioners, hospi

76.
77.
78.

79.

[d. at 2195, 411 N.E.2d at 463.
[d.
[d.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. eh. 231, § 608 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
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tals, and their insurers, asserted that the increased number of mal
practice actions that would follow adoption of a discovery rule was
not their primary concern. Rather, defendants worried that uncer
tainty as to the length of the period during which claims could be
asserted against an insured would so unsettle the rating process as
to make insuring doctors and hospitals very expensive or even pro
hibitive. That is, by creating a "long tail"80 of liability, a discovery
rule could impair the insurers' effectiveness in predicting future li
ability. Although the court failed to address this argument, proba
bly in deference to the legislature, the solution seems clear.

D.

Statutory Solution: Outer-Limit Statute

Most of the states that have adopted the discovery rule have
legislatively placed an outer limit on the statute of limitations. 81 A
discovery rule with an outer limit provides that the statute will be
gin to run upon discovery, but in no event may the plairtiff com
mence an action more than a specified period from the date of the
negligent act. The discovery rule with a reasonably lengthy outer
limit appears to be a wise compromise between the needs of the
victims of malpractice and the needs of health care providers and
insurers. Victims benefit because symptoms, in most cases, will ap
pear by the time the outer limit is reached. Insurers' needs also
are met since insurance rating can be relatively certain due to the
absolute cutoff date for claims.
80. See generally Anderson v. \Vagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 307, 402 N.E.2d 560, 565
(1979), appeal dismissed sub nom. Woodward v. Burnham City Hosp., 101 S. Ct. 54
(1980).
81. Alabama (ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1975»; Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-564 (West Cum. Supp. 1980»; California (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (Deering
SUPP· 1980»; Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-105 (1977»; Connecticut (CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West 1969»; Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6856
(Cum. Supp. 1980»; Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(b) (West Supp. 1980»;
Hawaii (HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-7.3 (1977»; Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980»; Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1(9) (West Cum. Supp.
1980»; Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(c) (1976»; Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 413.140(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1980»; Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (West
Supp. 1980»; Maryland (MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1980»;
"'lissouri (Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (Vernon Supp. 1981»; Montana (MONT. REV.
CODES A:\,N. § 27-2-205 (1979»; Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2828 (1978»;
Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.097 (1979»; North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE §
28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1979»; Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(B) (Page Supp.
1980»; Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110(4) (1979»; South Carolina (S.C. CODE §
1.5-3-545 (Cum. Supp. 1980»; Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3415 (Cum. Supp.
1979»; Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (Supp. 1979»; Vennont (VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § .521 (Supp. 1980»; Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 416.350 (Cum.
Supp. 1981).
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Outer-limit statutes, however liberal, time-bar some claims
prior to maturity. Because of this, outer-limit statutes recently
have been subjected to attack on the ground that such statutes,
like any nondiscovery statute of limitations, violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment in that they deprive persons of
property, a claim, without due process. 82 Courts reviewing outer
limit statutes have found them reasonable both in protecting most
victims and in eliminating "long tail" liability; therefore the statutes
do not contravene due process. 83 In October 1980, the United
States Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal in one of these
due process cases, Woodward v. Burnham City Hospital,84 so the
constitutionality of outer-limit statutes has not yet been established
definitively.
Having considered the weight and trend of judicial decisions
and the various policy positions regarding discovery rules, the
court in Franklin squarely overruled Capucci and Pasquale, hold
ing that "a cause of action for medical malpractice does not 'accrue'
under C. L. c. 260, § 4, until a patient learns, or reasonably should
have learned, that he has been harmed as a result of defendant's
conduct. "85 Because no "foreign objects" were involved in the
cases before it, the court refused to limit the scope of its discovery
rule to malpractice actions which arise from the presence of foreign
objects left in the patient's body.86 Though many states have lim
ited the SCbpe of their discovery rules to foreign object cases, the
supreme judicial court, in dicta, observed that it could discern no
principled basis for such a distinction. 87
III.

CONCLUSION

Prior to 1980, Massachusetts' statute of limitations for medical
malpractice actions barred claims commenced more than three
years from the date of injury, regardless of whether the injury was
discoverable within that period. In 1980, Massachusetts joined the

82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
83. See, e.g., Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1968); Owen v.
Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976); Landgraff v. Wagner, 26 Ariz. App. 49,
546 P.2d 26 (1976); Dunn v. Felt, 379 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1977); Anderson v. Wagner,
79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979), appeal dismissed sub nOIll. Woodward v.
Burnham City Hosp., 101 S. Ct. 54 (1980).
84. 101 S. Ct. 54 (1980).
85. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2188; 411 N.E.2d at 459-60.
86. Id. at 2196, 411 N.E.2d at 464.
87. Id.
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vast majority of American jurisdictions by adopting a discovery rule
for medical malpractice actions. The discovery rule promotes fair
ness by providing plaintiffs with the right to assert their claims
once they discover they have been wronged. The Massachusetts
legislature might perceive the resulting "long tail" liability as un
reasonably aggravating the medical malpractice crisis: expanding
the period when individuals may file claims will increase the num
ber of malpractice actions brought and will raise the price of insur
ance premiums. Should the legislature wish to alleviate these addi
tional burdens yet uphold the discovery rule, a solution adopted in
the majority of states is available: An outer-limit statute. A discov
ery rule with an outer-limit statute allows a plaintiff to commence
an action upon discovery of an injury but no later than a specified
period from the date of the negligent act. If an outer limit is
grafted onto the discovery rule announced in Teller and Franklin,
then Massachusetts' discovery rule, like those enacted in the ma
jority of jurisdictions, will accommodate the needs of both doctors
and patients.

